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
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DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR: COMOR
JQReber 
5 May 1961


1. The Laos situation appears to have taken a turn in which the threat of direct Communist Chinese intervention appears less likely than some days ago. It may well be that the truce negotiations and aftermath will enable the Communists to consolidate their gains and achieve all their objectives for the time being. There are indications at the moment, for example, that the Communists have initiated more aggressive activity in South Vietnam. Should a contingency arise where the Communist Chinese do intervene in developments in South East Asia the United States Forces committed to support present and future contingency plans lacks adequate information to determine the military capabilities in South China north and northeast of the North Vietnam border and on Hainan Island.

2. Photography of Indochina in January 1961 has clearly demonstrated that we can learn extensive details bearing upon airfields' installation storage, port activities, military encampments, and in some cases electronic installations. Previously oblique photography extending to the north border of North Vietnam showed extensive new transshipment capabilities and suggests activities further north in ChiCom.


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Copy 1--DDI(P) TCO
11--OCI TCO
12--OSI TCO
13--ORR TCO
14--Director, NPIC
15--TSO CIA
16,17--C/DMD/NPIC
18--DDP TCO
19--Intel Staff/DPD
20--SO/DPD
21-26--C/SRS/DPD/DDP

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